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REFLECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS IN CHILE
James P. Careyt
I. Introduction
In "Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation and Chal-
lenges," Chilean Professors Blanco and Rojas (with the translation help of
Loyola University Chicago Adjunct Professor Richard Hutt) describe with admi-
rable clarity and succinctness the dramatic reforms currently under way in the
Chilean Criminal Justice system. What they do not-and cannot-communicate
in an article, is the great sense of momentous change which one gets from talking
with lawyers and law students in Santiago, Chile. My colleague, Bill Elward,tt
and I experienced this sense of change during our June 2004 visit. We had been
invited by Professors Rojas and Blanco to teach trial advocacy skills to law stu-
dents of Universidad Alberto Hurtado in Santiago and also to practicing lawyers
who were pursuing a certificate program there. Alberto Hurtado is leading the
way in preparing its students and practicing lawyers to effectuate the reforms.
Having just said that this great excitement and hopefulness cannot be commu-
nicated by writing about it-nevertheless, I will try to capture the feeling in this
article. I will then comment on some of the reforms described in the article by
drawing some comparisons with the American system and the Italian experience
in the reform of its criminal code, which began in 1988.
II. The Andes and Father Montes
We landed in Santiago at daybreak, the Andes obscuring the sunrise and loom-
ing in the horizon as the plane descended. The city itself seemed tucked into the
very base of the mountains, which jut so vertically into the sky they seem to
overhang the city. In retrospect, the presence of the mountains serves as an apt
metaphor for the relationship between Chile's hopeful present and its recent past.
The repressive Pinochet regime looms over Chile's reform effort, like the moun-
tains over the city. Pinochet is a physical presence, residing as he does presently
in Santiago, awaiting trial on many charges.
Bill Elward and myself were given a tour of Alberto Hurtado in June 2004.
On the spur of the moment, we were ushered into the office of the University
President, Father Montes, S.J. If the mountains serve as a metaphor for the chal-
lenges facing Chileans in their attempt to reform their society, Father Montes
exemplified the spirit and courage with which the effort has been undertaken.
Although we had intruded on his day unexpectedly, he welcomed us warmly and
motioned us to sit around a small table. For the next half hour, Father Montes
answered our many questions about Chilean society and about the university. He
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described his own role in creating the university out of what had formerly been a
Jesuit Institute, of the university's mission to expand higher education beyond the
traditional elite, and of creating the "new man." His dramatic story and lofty
ambition were communicated in a soft-spoken, self-effacing manner. After-
wards, when we reflected on just what Father Montes had accomplished, on the
very real-even dangerous-obstacles he had overcome, we both felt that we
had met a hero. We also both felt that we could justly feel proud to be lawyers
because we were reminded by his personal example and by his endeavor that law
is a powerful engine for social change.
The sense of dynamism and of peril inherent in the Chilean criminal justice
reform was personified in Father Montes.
III. The Chilean Reform Compared to the American System and to the
Italian Reforms of 1988
To give the Chilean reforms context, and to suggest what issues may arise in
the implementation of the reforms, I will compare the Chilean reforms with Ital-
ian reforms in three areas: the oral trial, the prosecutor's role, and the protection
of individual rights.
These comparisons are easily drawn thanks to the research of Professor Wil-
liam Pizzi of the University of Colorado Law School and his colleagues. I will
draw on two of his articles about the Italian system as a basis for my
comparisons.'
A. The Oral Trial
Professors Blanco and Rojas assert that, following the reforms, Chile now has
an oral trial system. Its contours however are unclear. They refer to "oral argu-
ment," and that the system "presupposes a well-structured trial."' 2 They describe
the role of a newly created three-judge panel where the "presiding judge ...
follows the rules of procedure and solves with his peers the objections entered by
the parties during the examinations and cross-examinations." 3 This implies a
trial very much like an American trial, where counsel controls the presentation of
the information through direct and cross examination and judges appear relegated
to a passive role.
Indeed, Bill Elward and I spent our time teaching the rudiments of witness
examination to the lawyers and students last June, evidencing the Chilean com-
mitment to train lawyers equipped to actively conduct an oral trial.
The Italian reform of 1988 included a similar enhancement in the roles of the
advocates. Pizzi and Montagna note however, that in practice there appears to be
I William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties
of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1992);
William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy,
25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429 (2004).
2 Rafael Blanco, Richard Hutt & Hugo Rojas, Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile:
Evaluation and Challenges, 2 Loy. U. CHI. iNT'L L. REV. 253 (2005) [hereinafter Blanco & Rojas].
3 Id. at 259.
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grudging acceptance of this change. 4 For example, Article 507 of the Italian
code permits the trial judge to call witnesses himself, rather than relying solely
on the litigants. 5 Further, two appellate court opinions in 1992 and 1993, respec-
tively, emphasized "that while the power of the parties to introduce evidence at
trial is important, this power cannot preclude a judge from seeking additional
evidence that the judge believes is necessary for a proper decision of the case." 6
Pizzi and Montagna see this as an example of the continuing influence of the
civil law tradition.7 It is likely that Chile will have to work through a similar
delineation of its trial procedure against a background of a deeply ingrained civil
law tradition.
Blanco and Rojas state that there are "rules of evidence and rules regarding the
form of questioning witnesses" that must be enforced by the judge.8 Tradition-
ally, civil law systems are not bound by a plethora of evidence rules, instead
trusting the trial judge to determine the probative weight of the evidence. Blanco
and Rojas appear to be referring to the rule against hearsay in this statement,
indicating Chile's clear move away from the civil law tradition and into an adver-
sarial system.
Pizzi and Montagna cite two recent appellate court decisions which suggest
that, although cross-examination has been incorporated into the Italian system in
order to provide adversarial testing, it has not been viewed in the same light as it
has in the United States.9 One case permitted the police to relate in court state-
ments from witnesses-even though the defense could not cross examine the
makers of the statements.10 Another case permitted introduction of an accom-
plice's confession against the defendant, despite a clear prohibition of such an
admission in Article 513(2) of the Code. I I
These evidentiary rulings, which permit hearsay and thereby derogate from the
right to cross-examine, suggest the kinds of issues which Chilean judges will be
called upon to address.
B. The Prosecutor
a) Institutional Role
In the American system, the prosecutor is in the executive branch, and by
virtue of the separation of powers doctrine is apart from the judiciary and the
legislature. This separation has important consequences for the prosecutor and
his exercise of discretion.
4 See generally Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1.
5 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 447.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Blanco & Rojas, supra note 2, at 259.
9 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 449-55.
10 Id. at 451-52.
11 Id. at 452-55.
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In addition, the prosecutor is apart from police agencies. For the most part,
prosecutors prosecute and police investigate. 12 Yet, there are ways in which the
prosecutor and police are treated as one, namely in the application of exclusion-
ary rules of evidence. If the police violate the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused, the prosecutor loses the evidence. Knowledge which the police have is
imputed to the prosecution, so that a conviction will be reversed for failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused, whether known or unknown to the
prosecutor.
The Italian prosecutor plays quite a different role than the American prosecu-
tor. Following the report of a crime, the Italian public prosecutor controls the
investigation, while the judge serves as a check on his power. 13 Moreover, the
judge and the prosecutor are part of the same professional association, "the
magistratura.' ' 14
The Chilean reform "totally separates the prosecutorial from the decision mak-
ing process."' 5 This separation was accomplished by the creation of the Office
of the Public Ministry which is designed solely to prosecute.16 This system will
avoid the entanglement that the Italian prosecutor faces in investigating and pros-
ecuting a crime, while enhancing the prosecutor's discretionary power.
b) Discretion and Plea Bargaining
American prosecutors on the one hand, have great discretion by virtue of the
separation of powers doctrine. Civil law prosecutors on the other hand, are said
to be constrained by the doctrine of mandatory prosecution. Mandatory prosecu-
tion virtually eliminates plea bargaining.
The Italian reform created opportunities for plea bargaining, but in a narrow,
rigid form.17 Yet, even though bargaining is limited in the kinds of crimes that
can be bargained and in the range of available dispositions, one feature of the
Italian plea bargaining is more advantageous to the accused than the American
system. The Italian judge maintains greater control over the outcome of the case
than his American counterpart. In certain circumstances the trial judge may give
the defendant the reduced sentence which he sought even though the prosecution
has refused to accept the bargain. In Italy, the accused does not enter a plea of
guilty,
[i]nstead plea bargaining in Italy is supposed to function not as a request
to the judge to "accept" a guilty plea as in the U.S. model, but rather as a
12 Sometimes prosecutors will conduct investigation using the power of the grand jury. Federal pros-
ecutors play this role more frequently than state prosecutors, ordinarily because the latter prosecute street
crime for which investigation is provided by local police.
13 Pizzi & Marafiotti, supra note 1, at 13.
14 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 446.
15 Blanco & Rojas, supra note 2, at 255.
16 See generally Office of the Public Ministry Web site at http://www.minpublico.cl (last visited
Sept. 5, 2005).
17 Pizzi & Marafiotti, supra note 1, at 21.
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request to evaluate the case from several different angles and determine if
the defendant is indeed guilty and if the reduced sentence being sought is
an appropriate way to avoid a trial and yet permit an adequate sentence. 18
The Chilean reform explicitly creates limited prosecutorial discretion, and pro-
vides for three "alternative forms of dispute resolution" including a kind of plea
bargaining. 19 One of these alternatives, "Acuerdo Reparatorio," available for
property crimes and less serious crimes, involves negotiation between offender
and victim.2 0 Any agreement must be ratified by the Guarantee Judge ("Jueces
de Garant(a").2 1 The active role accorded to the victim in this alternative reflects
a traditional characteristic of the civil law. In the civil law tradition, victims are
permitted to appear through counsel and to present evidence.2 2 Victims can also
appeal the trial court's decision. Although victims in the American system have
been permitted to play a role in sentencing hearings, they have no advocacy role
at trial.2 3
As for so-called "plea bargaining," the Chilean reform permits negotiation be-
tween prosecutor and defense counsel for crimes carrying a sentence of less than
five years.2 4 The Guarantee Judge has final control over the sentence.
25
The Chilean reform thus echoes the Italian change, by providing for
prosecutorial discretion and forms of plea bargaining. Like the Italian changes,
these are limited changes designed both for efficiency and transparency. The
new practices remain a far cry, however, from those available in the United
States-for better or worse.
C. Individual Rights
The exclusionary rule is a salient feature of the American system: Illegally
seized evidence-confessions which are improperly obtained, identifications
which are the result of unnecessary suggestiveness-are all excluded as evidence
from the state's case-in-chief in order to deter the police from violating the sus-
pect's rights. Civil law systems, although they uniformly preclude admission of
coerced confessions, do not seek to protect individual rights through the exclu-
sion of evidence. Even the English system, precursor to the American system,
does not employ a blanket exclusionary rule.
An important aspect of the Chilean reform-not surprising in light of the Pi-
nochet regime-is the creation of a special judicial branch, the Guarantee
Judge.2 6 Blanco and Rojas do not delineate the specific function of these judges,
18 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 444.
19 Blanco & Rojas, supra note 2, at 257-58.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note t, at 433.
24 Blanco & Rojas, supra note 2, at 258.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 256.
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but the rationale for their creation is the protection of individual rights. 27
Whether these judges can exclude evidence because of illegal searches or im-
proper interrogation is unclear.2 8 Blanco and Rojas refer to the role of Guarantee
Judges in assuring "due process," which includes the presumption of innocence,
the right to a speedy trial, the right to a quality defense for those without means
to hire an attorney, the right to confront witnesses and evidence, and the right to
an honest judge.29
When Bill Elward and I visited Alberto Hurtado, we were asked to give a
public lecture about the exclusionary rule as a means of protecting individual
rights. We were introduced as well to Professor Hector Hernandez Basualto of
the Alberto Hurtado faculty, who had recently published an article about exclu-
sion of evidence under the new reform.30 Unfortunately for us, the article is in
Spanish; but publication of such an article indicates that exclusion is part of the
academic discussion surrounding the Chilean reform which will hopefully play
some role in the new procedure.
IV. Conclusion
Professors Blanco and Rojas characteristically do not mention their own roles
in the Chilean reforms. Professor Blanco played a key role as a lobbyist for
reform in the legislature. Professor Rojas and he, together with their colleagues,
have made Universidad Alberto Hurtado a center for the training of lawyers and
law students in the skills and procedures of the new system. 31 They, and Father
Montes, are inspirations to an American lawyer, who is reminded by their heroic
example of the power of the law to effect social change, but also of the precari-
ousness of the rule of law, which relies on men and women of courage to make it
real.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 256.
30 Hector Hernandez Basualto, La Exclusi6n de la Prueba Ilicita en el Nuevo Proceso Penal Chileno,
2 Codecci6n de Investigaciones Juridicas 3 (2004).
31 See generally Universidad Alberto Hurtado Web site, at http://www.uahurtado.cl/ (last visited
Sept. 5, 2005).
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